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The Colorado River, flowing through 1,300 miles of Wyoming,
Colorado, New Mexico, Arizona, Utah, Nevada, and California,' is a
primary source of water for the arid Western United States As the
lifeblood for so many, the Colorado River has long been at the heart
of controversies over water rights. Rapid population growth and a re-
cent drought4 have both increased demand for and decreased supply
of the water resources of the Colorado River, resulting in heightened
conflict over water rights on the river. The interest groups competing
for these water rights include irrigation water districts (groups that
sell water to farmers for agricultural uses), municipal water districts
(groups that sell water to city dwellers for household uses and to
companies for industrial uses), and the federal government (which
uses water for environmental purposes, such as protecting endangered
species,' and other public purposes).
f B.A. 1999, University of Notre Dame; J.D. Candidate 2005, The University of Chicago.
I For a description of the Colorado River, see generally Charles J. Meyers, The Colorado
River, 19 Stan L Rev 1 (1966).
2 See id at 1 ("The [Colorado River and its tributaries are] the only significant source of
surface water in an area bounded by the Rocky Mountains on the east and the Sierras on the
west.").
3 See U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of Reclamation, Water 2025: Preventing Cri-
ses and Conflict in the West 4 (May 2003), online at http://www.doi.gov/water2025/Water2025.pdf
(visited July 14, 2004) (listing "explosive population growth" as one factor contributing to a wa-
ter management crisis in the American West).
4 In 2002, rainfall in the Colorado Basin was the lowest in recorded history. See id at 8.
See also Kirk Johnson and Dean E. Murphy, Drought Settles In, Lake Shrinks and West's Worries
Grow, NY Times § 1 at 1 (May 2, 2004) (noting that, according to the United States Geological
Survey, "[t]he period since 1999 is now officially the driest in the 98 years of recorded history of
the Colorado River").
5 See Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub L No 93-205, 87 Stat 884, codified at 16 USC
§ 1531 et seq (2000). See also David H. Getches, The Metamorphosis of Western Water Policy:
Have Federal Laws and Decisions Eclipsed the States' Role?, 20 Stan Envir L J 3,53 (2001):
The ESA requires all officials who grant federal permits or approvals to assure that the
proposed actions do not jeopardize the continued existence of any species listed by the US
Fish and Wildlife Service as threatened or endangered. Because the construction, alteration,
or operation of virtually every major water facility, whether public or private, requires some
kind of federal permit, and much of the undeveloped water in the West affects sensitive
habitat, the ESA is often implicated.
6 See Getches, 20 Stan Envir L J at 58 (cited in note 5) (discussing the role of the federal
government in "protecting species and habitats under federal law, protecting navigable waters,
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Historically, water rights in the Colorado River were established
by first possession and included limited transfer rights.7 As a result of
these historical rules, the vast majority of water rights vested in tradi-
tional farming communities! With Western urban population growth,
the demand for urban uses of water has rapidly grown.9
The voluntary transfer of water rights from the agricultural indus-
try to urban water districts has been stymied by legal rules that place
severe restraints on the transfer of water rights.'° These restraints suc-
cessfully addressed the greatest problem involved in water transfers -
third-party effects." Indeed, restraints on transfers were an efficient
solution when the external third-party costs of transfers were greater
than the benefits gained by two-party transfers." Today, however, with
increased urban water demands, the value of transfers has increased'3
and, with technological advances, the third-party costs of water trans-
fers have decreased." Hence, restraints on alienation are no longer the
asserting Indian water rights and water rights for public lands, and dealing with international and
interstate water allocation").
7 For a discussion of the legal rules governing the Colorado River, see Part I.
8 See Getches, 20 Stan Envir L J at 62 (cited in note 5) ("Historically, most water in the
West was allocated to inefficient agricultural uses and some states adopted apparently irrational
barriers to transferring water to more efficient uses."). See also Leslie Linthicum, Farming Out
Water, Albuquerque Journal (June 8, 2003), online at http://www.abqjournal.com/water/
48023news06-08-03.htm (visited July 14,2004) ("Agriculture consumes roughly 80 percent of the
water in the West, but that is expected to change as municipal needs grow.").
9 See Getches, 20 Stan Envir L J at 61 (discussing the expected population growth in the
West and the resulting need for water transfers from agricultural uses to urban uses).
10 See Richard A. Epstein, Why Restrain Alienation?, 85 Colum L Rev 970,981-82 (1985):
[T]he English natural flow system allowed the alienation of water rights but only when tied
to the sale of the riparian lands.... The same uneasiness carries over to the present day, but
now the prohibition against the use of water on nonriparian land tends not to be absolute,
at least in the United States.
11 See generally George A. Gould, Water Rights Transfers and Third-Party Effects, 23 Land
& Water L Rev 1 (1988) (discussing third-party effects as the biggest impediment to the intro-
duction of water markets).
12 See Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules; Liability Rules and In-
alienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 Harv L Rev 1089,1111 (1972) (noting that entitlement
inalienability is efficient when no party would purchase the entitlement if he were required to
pay all the costs incurred by third parties that result from the transfer); Epstein, 85 Colum L Rev
at 981-82 (cited in note 10) (noting that restraints on alienation might help preserve the value of
the common pool of water resources); Mark Kanazawa, Origins of Common-Law Restrictions on
Water Transfers: Groundwater Law in Nineteenth-Century California, 32 J Legal Stud 153, 154
(2003) ("Restrictions on the ability of private parties to freely transfer water can, but do not nec-
essarily, serve to promote efficiency when the local costs inflicted on others are significant.").
13 Barry Nelson, a senior policy analyst for the Natural Resources Defense Council, de-
scribes the gap between the low price paid by the agricultural industry and that paid by the ur-
ban water districts as "an arbitrage opportunity." See Jim Carlton, Is Water Too Cheap?, Wall St J
Bi, B6 (Mar 17,2004).
14 See Statement of Assistant Secretary Bennett Raley, Department of the Interior, before
the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee Oversight Hearing on Water in the West
(Mar 9, 2004), online at http://www.doi.gov/water2025/news.html (visited July 14, 2004) ("The in-
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most efficient approach to the third-party costs that result from water
transfers.
However, the restraints still serve a distributional goal.'5 Com-
bined with the implicit subsidies granted to farmers in the form of
long-term government contracts for "cheap water" (water at prices
much lower than those paid by urban water districts),'6 the restraints
serve to enrich the agricultural communities. These distributional
goals," however, could be better achieved, at less cost to urban water
users, through direct subsidies to agriculture rather than legal protec-
tions and below-market pricing. With additional resources, agriculture
might purchase needed water at market prices, but would have incen-
tives to use the water it purchases efficiently, promoting environ-
mental ends, ' and would be able to engage in voluntary transactions,'9
promoting efficiency.0
As the efficiency justifications for restraints on water right trans-
fers have given way to distributional justifications, the movement for
reform in order to facilitate water transfers from the agricultural in-
dustry to urban water districts has gained momentum.2' There are two
competing views about who should control water right transfers in or-
der to minimize transaction costs. One view is that the state should be
given the right to oversee water transfers in trust for the public." If a
creased use of simple tools like water measurement structures, automated control structures, and
computer-based system monitoring can allow water users to either stretch their water supplies
further or make part of their supplies available on a willing seller-willing buyer basis for other-
wise unmet demands.").
15 See Calabresi and Melamed, 85 Harv L Rev at 1114 (cited in note 12) ("[J]ust as effi-
ciency goals sometimes dictate the use of rules of inalienability, so, of course, do distributional
goals. Whether an entitlement may be sold or not often affects directly who is richer and who is
poorer.").
16 See Carlton, Is Water Too Cheap?, Wall St J at B1 (cited in note 13) (noting that "farm-
ers' rates have been increased recently" but are "still nowhere near many of the urban rates").
17 See Calabresi and Melamed, 85 Harv L Rev at 1114-15 (noting that distributional
grounds are not necessarily undesirable).
18 See Carlton, Is Water Too Cheap?, Wall St J at B6 (noting that environmentalists argue
that higher water rates could change the crops grown in California to higher-value crops).
19 See Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J L & Econ 1, 15 (1960) (noting
that, in the absence of transaction costs, voluntary transfers will always take place if they lead to
an increase in value).
20 Calabresi and Melamed define economic efficiency as Pareto optimality-"that alloca-
tion of resources which could not be improved in the sense that a further change would not so
improve the condition of those who gained by it that they could compensate those who lost from
it and still be better off than before." Calabresi and Melamed, 85 Harv L Rev at 1094.
21 See Statement of Assistant Secretary Bennett Raley (cited in note 14) ("Market-based
tools that rely on willing buyer-willing seller transactions are far more likely to provide stability
and avoid conflict than are regulatory or litigation-based alternatives for meeting unmet and
emerging needs for water.").
22 See generally Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Institutional Perspectives on Water Policy and
Markets, 81 Cal L Rev 671 (1993) (discussing the role of local administrative agencies in meeting
new water demands).
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new use served the public interest better than an old use, the govern-
ment would transfer the permit from the old use to the new use. The
other view is that transfer rights should be given to vested right hold-
ers who would voluntarily transfer rights through mutually beneficial
arrangements, in much the same manner that transfers of other pri-
vate property are made.2
The transaction costs involved in water transfers are numerous.
They include the information costs involved in quantifying the amount
of water available for transfer"4 and assessing the likely effects of the
transfer on third parties; the administrative costs of surmounting the
legal requirements for water right transfers, including resolving third-
party injury claims;5 and the actual transfer costs involved in transfer-
ring water from one use to another, including the external costs borne
by third parties.
Minimizing these transaction costs serves efficiency by allowing
the scarce water of the West to move from lower-value agricultural
uses to higher-value urban uses. In this Comment, I argue that placing
transfer rights in the hands of right holders best serves to minimize
transaction costs, as the transferring parties have the best information
about the marginal benefits of a particular water transfer. I then con-
sider the primary argument against this choice: that the administrative
regime is better suited to minimize the third-party costs of water right
transfers. In response, I propose liability rules to force transferring
parties to internalize the third-party costs of their transactions. A
liability rule eliminates holdout problems6 and forces transferring
parties to internalize the full costs of the transfer.2' Finally, I describe
23 See generally Andrew P. Morriss, Bruce Yandle, and Terry L. Anderson, Principles for
Water, 15 Tulane Envir L J 335 (2002) (suggesting that water law be built around private prop-
erty rights, common law legal doctrines, and individual court actions); Andrew R Morriss, Les-
sons from the Development of Western Water Law for Emerging Water Markets: Common Law vs.
Central Planning, 80 Or L Rev 861 (2001) (advocating for a common law and market-based ap-
proach to water rights rather than an administrative approach); Kevin M. O'Brien, Water Mar-
keting in California, 19 Pac L J 1165 (1988) (advocating for legislative enactments to facilitate
the adoption of water markets).
24 See Gould, 23 Land & Water L Rev at 20 (cited in note 11) (describing the complicated
procedures involved in quantifying water rights). See also Getches, 20 Stan Envir L J at 63 (cited
in note 5) ("There are three distinct kinds of climate variability that can affect water supply: cy-
clical variations, severe drought, and long-term climate change.").
25 See Gould, 23 Land & Water L Rev at 20-22.
26 See Calabresi and Melamed, 85 Harv L Rev at 1106-07 (cited in note 12) (discussing the
need for liability rules when holdout problems prevent transfers that would be beneficial for all
parties).
27 As noted by Calabresi and Melamed, liability rules are no guarantee of the economic
efficiency of a transfer. See id at 1125 ("Liability rules represent only an approximation of the
value of the object to its original owner and willingness to pay such an approximate value is no
indication that it is worth more to the [party that took the entitlement] than to the [original]
owner."). However, there is no reason to assume that the administrative regime would be any
better at approximating the value of water rights to the original owner than liability rules.
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where transfer rights in the hands of vested right holders, cabined by a
liability rule for third-party injury, might lead us.
Part I describes the current state of the law of water rights on the
Colorado River. In particular, I discuss the "no injury" rule, adopted to
deal with the external effects that result from a water right transfer,
which acts as a legal restraint on alienation.a In Part II, I note that the
current regime endows neither governmental entities nor private par-
ties with sufficient rights to effect water right transfers. I discuss the
two parties who might control water right transfers- either adminis-
trative agencies or private parties -and argue for private party control
of water transfers. Part III responds to the argument that private party
control cannot adequately account for the third-party effects of water
transfers by proposing a liability rule for injured third parties.
I. THE CURRENT REGIME: RESTRAINTS ON ALIENATION
According to state law, Western states nominally "own" water
rights which they hold in trust for water right holders.9 However, this
trusteeship operates in practice to provide a role for state control to
indirectly regulate water to promote its environmentally sound and ef-
ficient use."
In practice, Colorado River water rights are largely privatized.3'
Private parties hold property rights, albeit imperfect ones, in water."
They hold "use" rights to a certain volume of water,33 subject to forfei-
ture if the water use is not "reasonable and beneficial."'14 They also
28 See, for example, NM Stat Ann § 72-5-23 (2000) (allowing for changes in ownership of
water rights "if such changes can be made without detriment to existing water rights").
29 See, for example, National Audubon Society v Superior Court of Alpine County, 33 Cal
3d 419, 189 Cal Rptr 346, 364-65 (1983) ("The state has an affirmative duty to take the public
trust into account in the planning and allocation of water resources.").
30 See Frank J. Trelease, Government Ownership and Trusteeship of Water, 45 Cal L Rev
638, 653-54 (1957) (arguing that the notion that water ownership is held by the state "in trust"
for the people expresses little more than the government's interest in the conservation and effi-
cient use of water).
31 See David J. Hayes, Privatization and Control of US. Water Supplies, 18 Natural Re-
sources & Envir 19, 19 (2003) (noting that water rights are characterized as property rights and
the government's influence over rights is limited to indirect regulatory requirements).
32 See id.
33 For a description of a "water right," see Gould, 23 Land & Water L Rev at 5 (cited in
note 11):
An appropriation gives the appropriator the right to divert a specified quantity (e.g. 2 cubic
feet per second) of the flow of a stream, at a particular place, provided the water is not
needed to satisfy appropriations acquired at an earlier date. Thus, the parameters defining
an appropriative right are its (1) diversionary entitlement, (2) point of diversion, (3) pur-
pose of use, (4) place of use, and (5) priority date.
34 See Hayes, 18 Natural Resources & Envir at 22 (cited in note 31) ("[W]ater rights typi-
cally are defined with reference to the amount of water that is being reasonably and beneficially
applied .... Water that is 'wasted'-that is, not reasonably and beneficially used-is not within
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hold "exclusion" rights," the right to enjoin any other water right us-
ers' activity that infringes on their right.n However, water right hold-
ers hold very limited "transfer" rights, and this acts as a serious re-
straint on alienation." Because water rights are interdependent, the
protection of "exclusion" rights comes at a cost to the "transfer" rights,
as the act of transferring water rights often inflicts harm on the water
rights of third-party water right holders."
As the state holds only indirect regulatory power and private par-
ties hold limited transfer rights, neither party has the power to redirect
water to its highest-value uses.9 Simply granting transfer rights, either
to the government or to private parties, is not adequate to solve the
current resource allocation problem. The limitations on transfer rights
were developed for good reason-to address the interdependency of
water rights.'° Because water rights are so interdependent, a transfer
between two parties is likely to affect many other third-party water
users.
To promote efficient transactions, transfer rights, either in the
hands of government or private parties, must be fashioned so as to in-
ternalize the full costs of their transfers, not only to the transferring
parties, but also to third-party right holders.2 The internalization of
third-party effects, however, adds substantial transaction costs to wa-
ter right transfers: information costs about who will be affected, nego-
tiation costs incurred in making an arrangement with those who will
be affected, and holdout problems when many third parties are in-
volved.3 In the presence of such transaction costs, we consider which
the scope of the water right.").
35 See Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law § 3.1 at 32 (Aspen 6th ed 2003) (dis-
cussing the importance of exclusion rights in order to provide incentives for efficient use of
resources).
36 The right to enjoin infringing activity-the "no injury" rule-is discussed in detail in
Part I.B.
37 See Posner, Economic Analysis of Law § 3.1 at 33 (cited in note 35) (discussing the ne-
cessity of transfer rights for the efficient use of land).
38 See Epstein, 85 Colum L Rev at 981-82 (cited in note 10).
39 See Hayes, 18 Natural Resources & Envir at 19 (cited in note 31) (noting that the gov-
ernment does not have the power to redirect water resources).
40 See Epstein, 85 Colum L Rev at 982 ("[Plartial restrictions on alienation may help pre-
serve the value of common pool resources.").
41 See, for example, Farmers' High Line Canal & Reservoir Co v Wolff, 23 Coto App 570,
131 P 291,294 (1913) (discussing the interdependency of water rights: an upstream water user di-
verts water which he uses for irrigation; some of the water seeps into the ground and returns to
the stream as return flows; these return flows are then diverted for irrigation by a downstream
user).
42 See Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 Am Econ Rev Papers &
Proceedings 347, 350 (May 1967) ("[P]roperty rights develop to internalize externalities when
the gains of internalization become larger than the cost of internalization.").
43 See Gould, 23 Land & Water L Rev at 23 (cited in note 11) (discussing the high transac-
tion costs involved in water right transfers).
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set of entitlements among government and private parties "favors
knowledgeable choices between social benefits and the social costs of
obtaining them, and between social costs and the social costs of avoid-
ing them."'
A. The "Law of the River"
A brief overview of the body of law governing the Colorado
River, called the "Law of the River," cannot do justice to a system of
such vast complexity. However, it serves to illuminate the problems
associated with implementing an efficient regime for water rights and
to identify some of the historical solutions to those problems.
The Law of the River allocates water rights through a multi-
layered system that includes an interstate compact,5 federal law,"4 fed-
eral administrative agency decisions,7 state law," state administrative
agency decisions,9 agreements with Indian tribes,"° and a treaty with
Mexico. 1
During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the
West underwent a period of rapid development, increasing the de-
mand for Colorado River resources. Two important results followed
from this increased demand: a scheme providing a water allotment,
measured in acre-feet,2 to each state on the Colorado River,3 and the
44 Calabresi and Melamed, 85 Harv L Rev at 1096 (cited in note 12).
45 See Colorado River Compact of 1922, codified at Colo Rev Stat § 37-61-101 et seq
(2000) (apportioning the Colorado River between the Upper Basin (Wyoming, Colorado, Utah,
and New Mexico) and the Lower Basin (Arizona, California, and Nevada)).
46 See, for example, Reclamation Act of 1902, Pub L No 57-161, 32 Stat 388, codified as
amended at 43 USC § 371 et seq (2000) (allowing the federal government to undertake irrigation
projects).
47 Specifically, those made by the Bureau of Reclamation, a part of the Department of the
Interior.
48 See, for example, Cal Water Code (2003), Ann Cal Codes § 1 et seq (West 1971 & Supp
2004); Coffin v Left Hand Ditch Co, 6 Colo 443, 449-50 (1882) (repudiating common law rights
of riparian owners in favor of a first-appropriator-for-beneficial-use principle).
49 See, for example, Digest of Selected Water Rights Decisions of the California State Water
Resources Control Board and Its Predecessors, online at http://www.waterrights.ca.gov/hearings/
decisions/DecisionDigest.pdf (visited July 14,2004).
50 See, for example, Arizona v California, 373 US 546, 595-97 (1963) (noting that when
Congress created Indian reservations in the Colorado River Basin, it "reserved not only the land
but also the use of enough water from the Colorado to irrigate the irrigable portions of the re-
served lands").
51 See Treaty between the United States of America and Mexico Respecting Utilization of
Waters of the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and of the Rio Grande, 59 Stat 1219, Treaty Ser No
994 (1944) (regulating the joint use of international waters).
52 An acre-foot is equivalent to about 326,000 gallons. See Brent Israelsen, California Will
Cut Back Its Big Gulp; Colorado River Rights: Neighbors Relieved As the State Plans to Live
within Its Allotment and Conserve Water; Water Deal Reached with California Users, Salt Lake
Trib B1 (Dec 13,2003).
53 The allocation scheme is a product of the combination of the Compact of 1922 (cited in
note 45), allocating water among the Upper and Lower Basin; subsequent Upper Basin and
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construction of the Hoover Dam, which transformed "the erratic and
often destructive flow of the Colorado River into a controlled and de-
pendable water supply."""
Initially, most Western states through which the Colorado River
runs adopted the "prior appropriation" doctrine." A user obtains wa-
ter rights under this doctrine when he diverts water, applies it to a
beneficial use,6 and posts or records some notice of the appropria-
tion. 7 Priority among competing appropriators is governed by the
"first in time, first in right" principle. Under the prior appropriation
regime, the precise nature of the property right that attaches to the
water right has been a matter of debate. 9
Today, the appropriative right, in many jurisdictions, requires an
administrative permit.' Whereas at common law a right holder held an
appropriative right good against the government and against all, today
the right holder holds a permit granted by an administrative agency
on behalf of the government, which claims to control ownership over
all waters in its jurisdiction.6' In addition, the Reclamation Act of
190262 and the federal funding of the Hoover Dam construction
brought water in the Lower Basin (California, Arizona, and Nevada)
Lower Basin agreements; and legislation that defines individual state allocations. See Warren J.
Abbott, California Colorado River Issues, 19 Pac L J 1391, 1392-1410 (1988) (summarizing the
"compendium of legal documents" that form the Law of the River).
54 Arizona, 373 US at 554. See also Hayes, 18 Natural Resources & Envir at 20 (cited in
note 31) (describing the unreliability of the Colorado River as a water source before construc-
tion of the Hoover Dam).
55 For example, Colorado is a pure appropriation system. The Colorado Constitution reads:
"The right to divert the unappropriated waters of any natural stream to beneficial uses shall
never be denied. Priority of appropriation shall give the better right as between those using the
water for the same purpose." Coto Const Art 16, § 6. See also Coffin, 6 Colo at 447 (holding that
the first appropriator of water from a natural stream for a beneficial use has a right to that water,
and that the common law doctrine giving the riparian owner a right to the flow of water in its
natural channel over his lands is inapplicable in Colorado). California is a mixed system of ripar-
ian and appropriative rights. See Lux v Haggin, 69 Cal 255,4 P 919, 924-25 (1884) (holding that
an individual who acquired title to governmental land also received riparian rights, subject only
to previous appropriators).
56 Examples of beneficial uses include irrigation, domestic, mining, and recreational uses.
57 See Morriss, 80 Or L Rev at 880 (cited in note 23) (concluding that at common law, three
elements-diversion, beneficial application, and notice-roughly constituted a valid appropria-
tion in every jurisdiction, when done within a reasonable time of one another).
58 See Anthony Scott and Georgina Coustalin, The Evolution of Water Rights, 35 Natural
Resources J 821, 914 (1995) (stating that seniority is "a basic principle" in appropriative-ights
jurisdictions).
59 See, for example, State v Superior Court of Riverside County, 78 Cal App 4th 1019,93 Cal
Rptr 2d 276,281-86 (2000) (discussing the extent to which water can be owned).
60 See Scott and Coustalin, 35 Natural Resources J at 915 (cited in note 58) ("In the twen-
tieth century, in many American jurisdictions, the original appropriative right has become an
administrative permit.").
61 See id.
62 Pub L No 57-161,32 Stat 388, codified as amended at 43 USC § 371 et seq (2000).
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under the control of the Department of the Interior, a federal agency.'
The Department makes contracts with various private entities
throughout the Lower Basin for delivery of water from government-controled " 64
controlled reservoirs. Those who obtain permits or contracts with theDepartment of the Interior hold rights to use.
B. The "No Injury" Rule
As mentioned above, water rights are interdependent. An in-
crease or decrease in water use by one right holder will affect the
amount of water available to other right holders. A water right trans-
fer often results in a significant change in use, one that might affect
and perhaps injure third parties.65 For example, a transfer might result
in increased consumption by the transferee. Water usage often results
in return flows 6-water that returns back to the stream after percolat-
ing into the ground. Such return flows are difficult to quantify; direct
measurement of the amount of water a given user had been diverting
might fail to account for unrecognized return flows.6' Thus, the user
transfers more water than he had previously been using (direct diver-
sion less return flows). If the new user uses all of the water transfer,
the result might be a decrease in downstream flows and injury to
downstream right holders.
The no injury rule reduces the risk of such injury to third parties.
Primarily, it protects them by making the right to change a water right
secondary to the right to preserve currently vested rights. If injury to a
vested right is "substantial,"6' the transfer does not proceed unless the
63 See Hayes, 18 Natural Resources & Envir at 20 (noting that the federal government ac-
quired water rights under state law, so as not to override preexisting rights, and, following the
federal investment in infrastructure, the government became "the largest water wholesaler in the
world"); 43 USC § 617 (2000) (authorizing the Department of the Interior to contract for the
storage and use of water for irrigation).
64 Contracts for federally controlled water resources are administered by the Bureau of
Reclamation, an agency that operates under the Secretary of the Interior. See Carlton, Is Water
Too Cheap?, Wall St J at B1 (cited in note 13) (discussing the likely renewal of U.S. Bureau of
Reclamation contracts with farmers at subsidized rates).
65 For a technical discussion of the types of third-party effects that result from transfers,
see Gould, 23 Land & Water L Rev at 13-19 (cited in note 11).
66 For a discussion of return flows, see Joseph L. Sax, et al, Legal Control of Water Re-
sources: Cases and Materials 101-04 (West 3d ed 2000).
67 See Gould, 23 Land & Water L Rev at 20:
[Miuch of the writing on transfers and water marketing reads as if there were two metered
pipes, one for diversions and one for return flows, leading from the stream to the place of
use. Of course, such is not the case.... [O]ften return flows seep back over a broad stretch
of the stream or percolate into groundwater which is tributary to the stream, making direct
measurement impossible.
68 See Wolff, 131 P at 294 (holding that the injury claimed must be substantial, but that it
need not be in proportion to the right sought to be changed).
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transferring parties are able to reach a contractual arrangement with
the objecting parties.
The no injury rule operates as follows: parties seeking transfers
must obtain permission from the relevant authority, a state adminis-
61 7trative agency or a special water court.'° They file an application for
transfer, and notice of the proposal is published. Opponents of the
transfers, such as downstream users or those objecting on grounds of
environmental harm, are offered an opportunity to protest the trans-
fer.72 These opponents claim injury in that the transfer will result in the
transferee consuming more water than the transferor consumed;
changes in stream flow; changes in the time, frequency, or length of di-
version; or changes in water quality.3 In addition, some states grant
standing to parties protesting a transfer on environmental or public
interest grounds." These claims are resolved through informal negotia-
tions or formal hearings, lasting anywhere from a few hours to a few
weeks. The proceedings add significant transaction costs to any at-
tempt to transfer rights. Because of the uncertainty of the outcome of
the proceedings and high cost of generating the needed information
for the hearings, 6 many right holders are deterred from even attempt-
ing to transfer water rights."
69 For example, the California State Water Resources Control Board. See Cal Water Code,
Ann Cal Codes § 1252 (stating that permits for unappropriated water must be requested from
the State Water Resources Control Board).
70 See Colo Rev Stat § 37-92-302(1)(a) (2000) ("Any person who desires a determination
of a water right ... shall file with the water clerk in quadruplicate a verified application setting
forth facts supporting the ruling sought.").
71 See, for example, Colo Rev Stat § 37-92-302(3)(b) ("[Tlhe water clerk shall cause such
publication to be made of each resume or portion thereof in a newspaper or newspapers as is
necessary to obtain general circulation once in every county affected, as determined by the water
judge.").
72 In many states, any interested party may file a protest, whether or not the party is a wa-
ter user. See, for example, Bonham v Morgan, 788 P2d 497 (Utah 1989) (holding that the state
engineer was required to entertain the objections of landowners who did not use the water in
question). For an overview of the application process, see Sax, et al, Legal Control of Water Re-
sources at 229 (cited in note 66).
73 See George A. Gould, Recent Developments in the Transfer of Water Rights, in Kathleen
Marion Carr and James D. Crammond, eds, Water Law: Trends, Policies, and Practice 93, 94
(ABA 1995).
74 See, for example, National Audubon Society, 189 Cal Rptr at 353 n 11 (concluding that
the National Audubon Society, a third-party environmental group, had "standing to sue to pro-
tect the public trust").
75 See Gould, Recent Developments in the Transfer of Water Rights at 94 (cited in note 73)
("[V]irtually all appropriation states provide for proposed appropriations receiving some form
of public interest review by water officials.").
76 A survey of Colorado and New Mexico suggests that the cost of statutory transfer pro-
ceedings typically adds 20 percent or more to the cost of small purchases. See Thompson, 81 Cal
L Rev at 705 (cited in note 22) ("[S]tatutory transfer procedures impose costs of at least $300 per
acre foot on transfers of twenty acre feet or less.").
77 See Gould, 23 Land & Water L Rev at 23 (cited in note 11):
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The burden of proof in these cases rests on the parties seeking to
transfer rights. A third party need only claim that a proposed transfer
will cause injury. The parties proposing the transfer then must prove
that the transfer will not cause injury."' This proof is both costly and
difficult to obtain; evidence of no injury is at best speculative prior to
the actual transfer.79 Even a ruling in favor of the transfer might be
qualified by terms and conditions to limit the potential for third-party
injury, reducing the economic benefit of the transfer.8'
The no injury rule serves the important function of protecting
third parties from the deleterious effects of water transfers. However,
it also places serious restraints on alienation, preventing parties from
transferring water to its highest-value uses. These restraints may have
been efficient when water resources were not as scarce and the costs
incurred by third parties as a result of transfers most likely regularly
exceeded the benefits of the transfers. Today, however, the benefits of
the transfers are considered "arbitrage" opportunities," and such re-
straints on alienation serve distributive rather than efficiency goals-
they operate as an agricultural subsidy. These distributive goals,
achieved through a direct subsidy, would provide assistance to the ag-
ricultural industry, but do so in a way that would allow for beneficial
water transfers and a more efficient exploitation of Colorado River
water.
The effort and expense required to effectuate a transfer-the "transaction costs" in the jar-
gon of economists-is perhaps the greatest impediment to markets .... Collecting data, hir-
ing experts such as agronomists, engineers, and lawyers, and the protracted and dispute-
prone procedures associated with the identification, quantification, and mitigation of third
party effects makes for high transactions costs.
78 See, for example, Southeastern Colorado Water Conservancy District v Fort Lyon Canal
Co, 720 P2d 133, 146 (Colo 1986) ("The applicant for a change of water rights has the burden of
showing the absence of injurious effect.").
79 See note 77.
80 See, for example, Colo Rev Stat § 37-92-305(4):
Terms and conditions to prevent injury ... may include:
(a) A limitation on the use of the water which is subject to the change, taking into con-
sideration the historic use and the flexibility required by annual climatic differences;
(b) The relinquishment of part of the decree for which the change is sought . . . if nec-
essary to prevent an enlargement upon the historic use or diminution of return flow to
the detriment of other appropriators;
(c) A time limitation on the diversion of water for which the change is sought in terms
of month per year;
(d) Such other conditions as may be necessary to protect the vested rights of others.
s See Posner, Economic Analysis of Law § 3.1 at 33 (cited in note 35) (discussing how trans-
fer rights induce parties to transfer resources to the party who can use them most productively).
82 See note 12.
83 See note 13.
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II. A REGIME IN TRANSITION
The restraints on alienation imposed by the Law of the River are
becoming increasingly unworkable for the following reasons. First, as a
result of the prior appropriation doctrine and the long-term low-
priced contracts granted by the Bureau of Reclamation to the agricul-
tural industry, the majority of Western water rights are vested in the
agricultural industry. Irrigation alone utilizes 80 to 90 percent of the
water of the West.w Second, due to the high third-party costs of trans-
fers, the legal regime developed restraints on alienation because, in
the absence of water scarcity, the costs to third parties of water trans-
fer often exceeded the benefits to the transferring parties, resulting in
a net social loss. Third, today, the rapidly increasing urban water de-
mands due to a population boom8' and an extended drought " have in-
creased the value of urban water uses to the point that the current re-
straints on alienation no longer serve an efficient purpose." Rather,
the restraints now deter transfers where the benefits of the transfers
exceed the costs to third parties (and the benefits gained by the trans-
ferring parties are sufficient to compensate injured third parties). The
restraints deter the transfer of water resources to their most valuable
uses.
As a result, there is increasing pressure to both transfer and ac-
cept transfer of water rights. These transfer rights might be given to ei-
ther state administrative regimes, which control water fight transfers'
in an attempt to maximize the efficient exploitation of a scarce re-
source while minimizing third-party costs, or water right holders who
engage in voluntary transfer arrangements when they make both par-
ties better off.9 The strengths and weaknesses of these two regime
forms are discussed below.
A. Evidence of Change: The California Water Deal
The Colorado River Water Delivery Agreement, signed in Octo-
ber of 2003 by the Department of the Interior and the State of Cali-
fornia, suggests a shift in values-away from restraints on alienation
84 See Hayes, 18 Natural Resources & Envir at 22 (cited in note 31).
85 See note 3. For a discussion of urban water demands, see David S. Brookshire, et al,
Western Urban Water Demand, 42 Nat Resources J 873 (2002).
86 See note 4.
87 See U.S. Department of the Interior, Water 2025 at 4 (cited in note 3) (discussing the im-
pending water crisis).
88 See note 22.
89 See generally Morriss, 80 Or L Rev 861 (cited in note 23) (advocating for a common law
and market-based approach to water rights rather than an administrative approach); O'Brien, 19
Pac L J 1165 (cited in note 23) (advocating for legislative enactments to facilitate the adoption of
water markets).
90 See U.S. Department of the Interior, Issues of Interest: Colorado River Water Agreement,
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and toward transfers of water rights-that sets a precedent for future
change.9
California, for many years, had been using more than its allocated
share of Colorado River water. Negotiations to reduce the overuse
had been ongoing for many years. Parties to the negotiations included
the Department of the Interior, the City of San Diego, the Metropoli-
tan Water District, the Imperial Irrigation District, the Coachella Val-
ley Irrigation District, and the State of California. 3 The Metropolitan
Water District, which imports Colorado River water to supplement lo-
cal supplies, is a "cooperative of 26 cities and water agencies serving
18 million people in six counties." The Imperial Irrigation District
and Coachella Valley Irrigation District contract with the federal gov-
ernment through the secretary of the interior for water delivery, which
they subcontract to individual farmers.
These parties came close to resolution in 2002, but the deal col-
lapsed as the result of disagreement over the environmental ramifica-
tions of the transfer.99 At issue was the future of the Salton Sea, a body
of water fed entirely by agricultural runoff. As a result of the transfer,
the water level of the sea would drop, increasing its salinity and ad-
versely affecting wildlife.9 An agreement was not reached until Secre-
online at http://www.doi.gov/issues/colorado.html (visited July 14,2004).
91 Several recent California enactments demonstrate a policy shift in favor of transfers.
However, they do not reduce barriers to transfer and are thus mere beginnings to change. See,
for example, Cal Water Code, Ann Cal Codes § 109(a):
The Legislature hereby finds and declares that the growing water needs of the state require
the use of water in an efficient manner and that the efficient use of water requires certainty
in the definition of property rights to the use of water and transferability of such rights. It is
hereby declared to be the established policy of this state to facilitate the voluntary transfer
of water and water rights where consistent with the public welfare of the place of export
and the place of import.
See also id § 1011 (creating an appropriative right to conserved water, which can be sold or
transferred).
92 Tony Perry, The State; No Shortages Are Expected, MWD Says; Officials' Prediction
Counters a Warning That Drought May Halt the Allocation of Surplus Colorado River Water, LA
Times B6 (Dec 13, 2003) ("In recent years California has received as much as 800,000 acre-feet
of surplus water each year above its entitlement of 4.4 million acre-feet.").
93 See Bruce Babbitt, Western Water Policy-From Reclamation to Restoration, Remarks
of Interior Secretary at the University of Colorado, Boulder (June 8, 1999), online at
http://www.doi.gov/news/archives/speeches&articlesluniv.htm (visited July 14, 2004) (listing vari-
ous government districts the department has worked with to reach an agreement for transferring
up to 200,000 acre-feet of water to San Diego, "the largest water transfer in western history").
94 MWD Board Offers Financial Incentives to Spur Investment in Local Water Conserva-
tion, Reliability Projects, Business Wire (Nov 19,2003) (discussing incentives offered by the Met-
ropolitan Water District's board of directors).
95 See Mark van de Kamp, Historic Water Pacts Fill Attorney's Resume, Santa Barbara
News-Press (Nov 9, 2003) (discussing the negotiations of the agreement).
96 See John Fleming, Developers Offer Plans to Revive Salton Sea, Chi Trib C16 (Mar 5,
2004) (discussing the divergent interests in the future of the Salton Sea). The Salton Sea is a
product of the collapse of an irrigation canal from the Colorado River in 1905, pointing to an-
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tary of the Interior Gale Norton, a Colorado native, cut off Califor-
nia's access to surplus water on December 31, 2002.9 Negotiations
were expedited, centering on a deal to transfer 65 million gallons per
year from agricultural uses in the Imperial Valley to urban uses in San
Diego."' An agreement finally was reached in October 2003 when the
agricultural interests agreed to sell Colorado River water at below-
market prices to the State of California, which would then resell the
water to urban users at market prices. California agreed to spend $300
million from the resale to mitigate the environmental impact of the
transfer on the Salton Sea." In exchange for the agreement, Norton
granted California access to surplus Colorado River water for an in-
terim period and instituted a gradual phase-out plan for California's
use of the surplus water.
The Colorado River Water Delivery Agreement is an illustrative
example of the water conflicts of use that arise among agricultural us-
ers, urban dwellers, and environmental concerns. The agreement is a
political compromise, born out of a crisis created when the Depart-
ment of the Interior cut off surplus water supplies to California. Al-
though Norton's ultimatum led to results in this instance, the tactic
does not offer a roadmap for other negotiations or provide hope that
these deals will be made with any more ease in the future.
The agreement provides a precedent, though, indicating that the
no injury rule might become a weakening prohibition. While the
agreement provides for a transfer of Colorado River water to where it
is most needed (that is, urban uses in Southern California), it also
takes water away from Imperial Valley farmers whose farmland will
be idled in the wake of the transfer."° According to the Imperial
Group, the agreement will result in reductions in agricultural produc-
tion, loss of jobs in agriculture, and a reduction in the value of land.0 '
The Imperial Irrigation District had little choice. It had to either ac-
cept the deal or face the prospect of the water being taken by political
other dimension of water transfers that is difficult to weigh: water "engineering" creates both
positive and negative environmental externalities. See id.
97 See Susan Greene, Interior Tightens the Spigot on California; Colorado River Overuse
Leads to Big Cutback, Denver Post A-01 (Jan 1, 2003) (noting that the assistant interior secretary
lamented that his department was poised to impose "the most punitive measure[] in the history
of Colorado River politics" on California).
98 See Water: First Shipment in Colorado River Deal Ready, Greenwire (Dec 19,2003) (dis-
cussing water transfer agreements between California water districts from agricultural to urban
users).
99 See van de Kamp, Historic Water Pacts, Santa Barbara News-Press (cited in note 95)
(discussing the impact environmental concerns had on the deal).
100 See Harry Cline, Peace Elusive along Colorado River, Western Farm Press (Dec 6,2003).
101 See id.
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force.'0 The agreement appears to violate the no injury rule in that the
farmers are in fact injured by the end result.
B. The Debate: Administrative Control of Transfer Rights or
Private Party Transfer Rights?
There are strong arguments for both administrative and private
party control of transfer rights.'°3 As Ronald Coase notes in The Prob-
lem of Social Cost about third-party externalities:
All solutions have costs and there is no reason to suppose that
government regulation is called for simply because the problem
is not well handled by the market or the firm. Satisfactory views
on policy can only come from a patient study of how, in practice,
the market, firms and governments handle the problem of harm-
ful effects.'°
To the extent that we lack a "patient study" of how the various institu-
tions handle third-party externalities in water right transfers, a final
conclusion on the appropriate system is not warranted. However, the
strengths of regulatory solutions are often overestimated.0  Unless
costly regulatory regimes do a significantly better job of reducing ex-
ternalities, the added costs are not worth the countervailing reductions
in externalities. ' With these considerations in mind, I discuss the ar-
gument for administrative control, but then attempt to define a
workable solution that places transfer rights in the hands of private
parties, rather than administrative agencies.
1. The arguments for and against administrative control.
The argument for administrative control proceeds as follows: wa-
ter rights are interdependent. A change in use by one party necessarily
affects many other parties. Thus, private party water transfers are
likely to inflict negative external costs on third parties. Because of
high transaction costs,'° third parties cannot protect themselves from
102 See id.
103 For a discussion of both systems, see Morriss, Yandle, and Anderson, 15 Tulane Envir L J
at 357-59 (cited in note 23); Joseph W. Dellapenna, The Importance of Getting the Names Right:
The Myth of Markets for Water, 25 Wm & Mary Envir L & Policy Rev 317 (2000).
104 Coase, 3 J L & Econ at 18 (cited in note 19).
105 See id ("It is my belief that economists, and policy-makers generally, have tended to
over-estimate the advantages which come from government regulation.").
106 See id:
[G]iven that the costs involved in solving the problem by regulations issued by governmen-
tal administrative machine will often be heavy ... , it will no doubt be commonly the case
that the gain which would come from regulating the actions which give rise to the harmful
effects will be less than the costs involved in Government regulation.
107 See id at 15 (noting that, in the absence of transaction costs, voluntary transfers will al-
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injury.'O These transaction costs include high information costs and
freeloader problems. High information costs result from the fact that
water right transfers have unpredictable outcomes. Thus, parties may
not know in advance whether the transaction or transfer will cause
them injury.'9 The only way to understand the likely effect of the
transfer is to hire expensive experts."  A freeloader problem results
because if there will be many injured parties as a result of the transfer,
some parties may try to freeload and assert that the value of the im-
pending injury is worth less to them than it actually is or nothing to
them in hopes that enough others will provide sufficient funds to
make it worth the while of the transferring parties to either forgo or
alter their transfer arrangement."' The argument for administrative
control of transfer rights asserts that high information costs and free-
loader costs can best be overcome by a collective valuation of a trans-
fer by an administrative agency. The agency would develop expertise
at assessing the likely third-party effects of transfers, reducing infor-
mation costs. It then would weigh the social benefits of the transfer
against the social harms and approve or deny the transfer based on
those considerations. Levels of compensation could be used to further
distributional goals. For example, the administrative agency might use
compensation for water transfers as a means to transfer wealth to the
agricultural industry.
As mentioned above, administrative control of transfer rights is
costly."2 First, there are large administrative costs involved in running
an administrative agency. Second, whatever might be gained in lower
information costs through agency expertise and repeated decisions
may be lost as a result of the increased information costs in becoming
familiar with the costs and benefits of every proposed transfer. Third,
the objective standard by which an administrative agency measures
costs and benefits might not actually map onto the subjective value
that parties attach to the water right. Such objective valuations offer
no guarantee that a transfer is efficient."3 Finally, administrative agen-
ways take place if they lead to an increase in value).
108 In the presence of high transaction costs, beneficial transfers might not take place. See
Harold Demsetz, When Does the Rule of Liability Matter?, 1 J Legal Stud 13,25-26 (1972). ("The
most obvious effect of introducing significant transacting cost is that negotiations will not be
consummated in those situations where the expected benefits from exchange are less than the
expected cost of exchanging.").
109 See Gould, 23 Land & Water L Rev at 23 (cited in note 11) (discussing the unpredict-
ability of outcomes of water right transfers).
110 See id (discussing the costs of making determinations about the third-party effects of
water right transfers).
Mll See Calabresi and Melamed, 85 Harv L Rev at 1107 (cited in note 12) (discussing the
freeloader problem).
112 See note 106.
113 See Calabresi and Melamed, 85 Harv L Rev at 1125 ("[Objective valuations] represent
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cies offer a target for rent-seeking activities,"' which might result in
distributional outcomes that are less desirable than the idealized pic-
ture presented above of compensation being used to transfer wealth
to the agricultural industry in line with some broader public policy
goal.
2. The arguments for and against private party control.
The argument for private party control proceeds as follows: vol-
untary transfers are the most efficient mechanism to move water
rights from low-value uses to high-value uses. In the absence of third-
party costs, because transfers will occur only if they are mutually
beneficial, they will occur only when they are efficient (that is, both
parties are made better off)."' In addition, information costs about
costs and benefits of various water uses are lower than under adminis-
trative control as private parties are able to rely on market prices for
information on the relative values of water uses."6 Thus, given lower
administrative, information, and rent-seeking costs,"7 and the benefit
of subjective, rather than objective, valuations, there is a strong argu-
ment that the best arrangement should provide private party control
of transfer rights.
The biggest drawback to the market-based model is third-party
effects."8 There are two important economic reasons why third-party
effects must be taken into account in water rights transfers."9 Third-
party protections are necessary to protect "exclusion" rights."" Such
only an approximation of the value of the object to its original owner and willingness to pay such
an approximate value is no indication that it is worth more to the [buyer] than the owner.").
114 See Saul Levmore, Property's Uneasy Path and Expanding Future, 70 U Chi L Rev 181,
183 (2003):
When property rights are assigned because of political maneuvering .... there is the danger
that the development of these rights promotes inefficient behavior either on the part of
those who seek to obtain wealth as the recipients of these assignments or by those who
hope to gain indirectly by redistributing rights to inefficient users from whom the lawmaker
can more easily collect taxes.
However, the shift to private party control does not necessarily eliminate rent-seeking activity.
Rather, it might just shift lobbying activity to subsidies or taxes on specific uses of water.
115 See Coase, 3 J L & Econ at 2 (cited in note 19).
116 See Morriss, Yandle, and Anderson, 15 Tulane Envir L J at 358 (cited in note 23) (noting
that information requirements for relative values are lower under private party control because
of the ability to rely on price signals).
117 This statement is subject to the caveat that rent-seeking activities might merely shift un-
der privately controlled transfer rights rather than dissipate. See id.
118 See Gould, 23 Land & Water L Rev at 22 (cited in note 11) (noting that third-party ef-
fects impede water markets).
119 See id at 24 ("First, the protection of third parties promotes more complete utilization of
water resources by providing security to water development by junior appropriators.... Second,
the protection of third parties promotes economic efficiency.").
120 See Posner, Economic Analysis of Law § 3.1 at 32 (cited in note 35).
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"exclusion" rights ensure secure rights and promote efficient exploita-
tion of water rights. Secure right holders have incentives to invest in
improvements to maximize the value of their water rights."' In the ab-
sence of such security, the right holders have less incentive to make
these investments given the increased probability of the loss of some
or all of their water rights. The second reason is that forcing transfer-
ring parties to internalize the external costs of the transfer ensures
that transfers are economically efficient, that the social value of the
transfer exceeds the social cost. 122 If the transferring parties have to
compensate all the injured third parties, they will proceed only if the
benefit of the transfer exceeds the third-party costs.
Administrative control, by developing expertise at assessing the
likely third-party effects of a given transfer and operating by adminis-
trative fiat, which avoids the transaction costs associated with holdout
and freeloader problems, addresses third-party effects. For private
party control to function more efficiently than administrative control,
then, we must put in place a mechanism to account for the external
third-party effects of water right transfers. Absent such a mechanism,
property rights in water would become too uncertain, reducing incen-
tives to exploit water efficiently. Thus, there must be legal rules that
protect third-party interests in voluntary transfers.
III. PROPOSED TRANSFER RULES
In this Part, I consider the best arrangement to protect third par-
ties from these negative externalities under private party control of
transfer rights. There are two alternative arrangements that would
protect third-party property rights. One is to leave third parties to pro-
tect themselves through contractual arrangements with the transfer-
ring parties. The other is to create legal rules to protect the property
rights of the third parties.
As Demsetz notes, "[Piroperty rights develop to internalize ex-
ternalities when the gains of internalization become larger than the
cost of internalization."' This Part will consider the costs of external-
ities to third parties if there are no third-party protections. I will then
consider the benefits of internalization if we develop a liability rule to
protect third-party rights. Finally, I will attempt to weigh these costs
and benefits and assess whether the gains of internalization outweigh
the costs.
121 See id.
122 See Gould,23 Land & Water L Rev at 24 (cited in note 11).
123 Demsetz, 57 Am Econ Rev Papers & Proceedings at 350 (cited in note 42).
[71:16611678
Colorado River Water Rights
A. No Third-Party Protections
As Coase notes:
The problem which we face in dealing with actions which have
harmful [third-party] effects is not simply one of restraining
those responsible for them. What has to be decided is whether
the gain from preventing the harm is greater than the loss which
would be suffered elsewhere as a result of stopping the action
which produces the harm."4
Thus, third-party protections from harm are needed only if the bene-
fits of protections exceed the costs, including enforcement costs.'
In the absence of transaction costs, there would be no need for
third-party protections."' Rather, if the cost of the injury to a third
party exceeded the benefits of the transfer to the transferring party,
the third party would pay the transferring parties to forgo the transac-
tion. If the cost of the injury to the third party was less than the gain to
the transferring parties, the transfer would proceed as the transfer
would still be efficient. Thus, in the absence of transaction costs, no
third-party protections are necessary to maximize efficiency.
B. Third-Party Protections
In the presence of transaction costs -information costs, negotia-
tion costs, freeloader problems -otherwise inefficient transfers might
proceed because the costs of overcoming the transaction costs to the
injured third parties exceed the benefits they would gain by stopping
the transfer. Hence, given transaction costs, the best solution might be
to force transferring parties to internalize the full costs of their trans-
fer by making them pay for the third-party effects of their transfer.'
In addition, third-party protections are an efficient means of
strengthening the "property right" held by each right holder. Eliminat-
ing protection dissolves the "exclusion" rights which provide incen-
tives to invest in maximizing the value of a water right. ' For example,
a farmer might not make the costly investment of lining his irrigation
124 Coase, 3 J L & Econ at 27 (cited in note 19).
125 See Richard A. Epstein, The Allocation of the Commons: Parking and Stopping on the
Commons, John M. Olin Law & Economics Working Paper No 134, at 7 (Chicago 2001), online
at http://www.law.uchicago.edu/Lawecon/index.html (visited July 14, 2004) ("The total elimina-
tion of these externalities is always an impossibility: externalities occur in too many forms and
styles. The hard question is what rule would minimize them, relative to the costs of their
control.").
126 See id at 6.
127 See generally Demsetz, 57 Am Econ Rev Papers & Proceedings 347 (cited in note 42).
128 See note 35 and accompanying text.
2004] 1679
The University of Chicago Law Review
canals because he is uncertain that his investment will pay off given
the risk that his water right might be taken.
Protection of exclusion rights, along with transfer rights, also en-
courages efficient allocation of river water rights as a whole. Under
the appropriation regime, which makes water rights available to any-
one able to appropriate, the Colorado River has become over-
allocated. Each additional appropriator increased the number of com-
peting demands on the river, inflicting external costs on prior appro-
priators.'29 So, today, right holders must deal with expensive conflicts
over use rights.
However, the rights to exclude and transfer create incentives to
reduce these conflicts of use. A right holder who is allowed to exclude
and resell his right has incentives to invest in a mechanism for mini-
mizing such conflict, which will lower the cost of holding and protect-
ing his right and increase its value. He might purchase the rights that
conflict with his right or enter contract agreements that avoid conflicts
of use.
Water storage facilities, such as the Kern Water Bank in Southern
California,o are an example of how private property rights help opti-
mize the allocation of water rights. These banks are repositories in
which right holders accumulate substantial amounts of water and then
act as distributors, reselling water to farmers, cities, and other consum-
ers. Because the water bank will sell only water when the benefits of
the sale exceed the costs of resolving any conflicts of use, these dis-
tributors will set resale prices at the optimal price -that is, the price at
which the marginal benefit of selling water exceeds the costs of resolv-
ing conflicts of use.
Under the current no injury rule, third parties relatively easily,
without establishing the likely costs of the transfer to them relative to
the benefit of the transfer as a whole, can enjoin a transfer. ' Too much
129 See Kanazawa, 32 J Legal Stud at 156 (cited in note 12).
130 The term "water bank" is used in two different senses in different states on the Colorado
River. Some states have "on-paper water savings accounts" where a water rights holder forgoes
his use for a period of time and allows someone else to use the water. This process allows for
temporary transfers during shortages without going through the lengthy legal process of water
transfers. See Leslie Linthicum, New Mexico's Water Plan, Albuquerque Journal A4 (Nov 11,
2003). The other type of water bank, and the type considered by this Comment, is an under-
ground water aquifer which acts as a sort of distribution center from which parties withdraw
their water use allotment. See Mark Arax, Massive Farm Owned by L.A. Man Uses Water Bank
Conceived for State Needs, LA Times B1 (Dec 19,2003).
The Kern Water Bank is an underground water aquifer-a "massive underground pool"-
that stores 730,000 acre-feet of water. It was conceived of in the mid-1980s by the California De-
partment of Water Resources. The state began building the bank, but never finished. It eventu-
ally sold the bank to Stewart Resnick, a large corporate farmer, who developed the bank into a
viable means to store water in wet years for use in dry years. See id.
131 See Part I.B.
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protection for third parties allows third-party holdouts to block effi-
cient transfers. In order to overcome an injunction, transferring parties
must either incur large legal costs in an effort to establish no injury132
or negotiate to pay third parties to allow the transfer to proceed. The
costs of the legal proceedings or the costs of negotiating with third
parties, including the information costs required to figure out who
would be injured and the amount of their injuries, are so great that
even though a transfer might benefit all parties (that is, the gain from
the transfer is enough to compensate all parties for their injuries), the
transfer does not occur.
For the successful operation of water markets, we need to find a
middle ground; we need a regime that will both facilitate transfers and
protect a right holder's right to exclusion by mitigating the negative
third-party effects of market transfers without imposing high adminis-
trative costs. We need to strike a new balance between transfer rights
and third-party rights. We need to look for a set of legal rules that
would reduce transaction costs and provide incentives for efficient wa-
ter use."'
C. Transfer Rules
The current rule allows third parties to obtain injunctions against
transfers at relatively low costs. These injunctions can only be over-
come at great expense to the transferring parties and, hence, some-
times deter efficient transfers. A modified no injury rule might strike a
better balance by allowing transfers to proceed when they are effi-
cient and enjoining transfers when they cause obvious third-party
harms. If injunctions were only issued when we were certain that the
transfer would cause third-party harm, transferring parties would be
forced to internalize the full costs of their transfers. In those cases
where there was uncertainty that the transfer would cause injury, we
would let the transfer proceed, but allow a third-party action for dam-
ages after the transfer if the transfer in fact proved to cause harm. This
after-the-fact liability rule for third-party effects cures the problem
that prior to the transfer a market valuation of probabilistic injury is
either unavailable or too costly to determine."'
132 See generally Gould, 23 Land & Water L Rev at 35-37 (cited in note 11) (discussing the
difficulties of ascertaining third-party effects and proving them in court).
133 See Calabresi and Melamed, 85 Harv L Rev at 1106 (cited in note 12) ("Often the cost
of establishing the value of an initial entitlement by negotiation is so great that even though a
transfer of the entitlement would benefit all concerned, such a transfer will not occur.").
134 See Posner, Economic Analysis of Law § 8.1 at 251 (cited in note 35) ("Although the
most dramatic economic function of the common law is to correct externalities ... it also has an
important function to perform in reducing transaction costs-notably by creating property
rights-and thus in enabling or facilitating, as distinct from simulating, market processes.").
135 See Calabresi and Melamed, 85 Harv L Rev at 1110 ("[A] very common reason, perhaps
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1. Modified no injury rule.
First, we consider a modified no injury rule that limits the injunc-
tive power of third-party claimants. This rule would require that trans-
ferring parties give notice of their transfers (reducing third-party in-
formation costs) and permit third-party objections, but would only al-
low third parties to enjoin transfers when they have demonstrable
evidence that the transfer will cause them tangible harm.
Under the current no injury rule, a protestor can prevent a pro-
posed transfer merely by filing a claim that "substantial" injury will re-
sult from the transfer."6 He need not have evidence that the injury will
actually occur. Rather, the applicants seeking transfer, for example, a
water district and a farmer, bear the burden of establishing "absence
of injurious results" from the proposed change.' Absence of evidence
that the change will cause injury is not sufficient. Rather, the applicant
needs to introduce positive evidence that the change will not cause in-
jury. Given uncertainties that are often present in water transfers, such
proof is difficult and expensive to produce. ' Because many third par-
ties might claim injury and seek injunctions, contractual solutions also
might prove difficult due to holdout problems."'
Thus, in a case where it is impossible to determine whether the in-
jury will happen prior to the actual transfer, the transfer will be de-
nied. For example, a Colorado court found that a water court could
not grant a transfer application if it was unable to assess what the ef-
fect of the transfer would be until after the water rights had been in
fact changed.'4° Thus, although the transfer might not have caused any
injury, because the applicant was unable to prove that it would not
cause injury, the applicant was not approved for the transfer.
the most common one, for employing a liability rule rather than a property rule to protect an en-
titlement is that market valuation of the entitlement is deemed inefficient, that is, it is either un-
available or too expensive compared to a collective valuation.").
136 See Farmers' High Line Canal & Reservoir Co v Wolff, 23 Colo App 570, 131 P 291,294
(1913) (holding that the injury claimed must be substantial, but that it need not be in proportion
to the right sought to be changed).
137 See Farmers Reservoir and Irrigation Co v Consolidated Mutual Water Co, 33 P3d 799,
811 (Colo 2001); Rominiecki v McIntyre Livestock Corp, 633 P2d 1064, 1068-69 (Colo 1981).
138 See Gould, 23 Land & Water L Rev at 35 (cited in note 11).
139 Even if the harm a third party will incur is small relative to the benefits of the transfer,
he can still enjoin the transfer. This power gives him an incentive to hold out for more compensa-
tion than the actual cost of his injury. If several third parties similarly hold out, the transfer might
not occur even though it is efficient. See Wolff, 131 P at 294. See also Calabresi and Melamed, 85
Harv L Rev at 1106-07 (cited in note 12) (discussing holdout problems).
140 See Thornton v Clear Creek Water Users Alliance, 859 P2d 1348,1360 (Colo 1993) ("It is
well settled under Colorado law that a water court generally may not grant an application for a
change in a water right unless the applicant has demonstrated that the change will not injure the
rights of other water users.").
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This high evidentiary burden creates high transaction costs which
deter beneficial transactions. It is subject to too many false positives-
finding harm where none exists. However, on the flip side, a low eviden-
tiary burden is subject to false negatives- failure to find harm where
harm exists. Hence, inefficient transfers might proceed. Thus, in the
abstract, it is difficult to assess which burden might be more efficient.
Put in context, however, placing the burden on third parties(which operates basically as a presumption in favor of the transferring
parties) makes sense on both efficiency and policy grounds. First, we
consider the tension in the current allocation of water rights. The ma-jority of the rights are vested in the agricultural industry, which em-
ploys water in low-value uses relative to higher-value urban uses.141
Hence, the current value of transfers should be efficient, creating large
enough gains to compensate all parties who are injured by the trans-
fer. Yet, these apparently efficient transfers are not occurring under
the current regime. Thus, transaction costs at present must be suffi-
ciently high to deter otherwise efficient transfers. While these transac-
tion costs to a large extent might be the product of the costs of actu-
ally moving water from one use to another, the rigidity of the current
legal framework seems at least to be contributing to these high trans-
action costs.
Thus, there are grounds for a presumption in favor of the transfer,
a presumption that assumes that the value of the transfers is sufficient
to compensate any unforeseen injury after the fact. In a world with no
transaction costs, the third parties would simply ask for a cut of the
gains of this efficient transaction and not enjoin the transaction. How-
ever, high information and negotiation costs seem to be deterring such
transactions. Thus, we shift the "transfer right" entitlement from third
parties into the hands of the transferring parties, so that they do not
need to incur the transaction costs required to "buy" the transfer enti-
tlement from third parties claiming injury. Second, as noted in the dis-
cussion of the recent California Water Deal, '42 there is growing support
for increased transfer rights as a matter of policy. There is a growing
recognition that the status quo allocation of water rights is not sus-
tainable and that a legal rule allowing for greater transfer rights, even
at the cost of some failures to enjoin inefficient transfers, is warranted.
This policy makes economic sense. The shift in transfer rights would
do much to enhance the efficiency of the allocation scheme as a whole.
Thus, even if a shift in transfer rights leads to some inefficient trans-
fers, as a whole the benefits of transfer should outweigh the costs.
141 See Carlton, Is Water Too Cheap?, Wall St J at B1 (cited in note 13) (noting the current
"arbitrage opportunity").
142 See Part II.A.
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Also, shifting the burden of proof should reduce the costs of the
injunction hearings. Under the current regime, parties seeking to make
a transfer must develop evidence regarding a speculative injury that
someone else might suffer."3 The shift in burden to the objector re-
duces information costs not only because proving likely injury is less
costly than proving absence of injury, but also because the third party
is in a better position than the transferring parties to have evidence
about the harms that the transfer will cause to his water right. The
proof will still be technical and costly to develop, but at least the bur-
den would rest on the party with the best access to information. In ad-
dition, this burden squares with our usual approach to injunctions:
there is no legal intervention unless the plaintiff has proof that the ac-
tions of third parties will cause substantial harm.
Although the modified no injury rule tips the balance in favor of
transferring parties, as now the objector is faced with incurring signifi-
cant costs in order to block the transfer, the objector can recover
damages should the transfer inflict real injury on the objector. In addi-
tion, we might leave open the possibility of a later injunctive remedy
for the objector if he is able to prove incompensable harm after the
transfer has been initiated. This shift in the burden of proof, coupled
with a liability rule if the transfer does in fact result in injury, should
reduce the current bias toward vested rights, allow for more transfers
between the agricultural industry and urban buyers, and ultimately al-
low water to be put to its most efficient uses.
Water transfers can also have negative environmental external-
ities. We can continue to allow a third-party objection right to trans-
fers on behalf of the environment under the modified no injury rule,
but we might also consider alternative solutions to the environmental
tradeoffs inherent in water transfers. For example, the implementation
of an environmental tax on water transfers might function to protect
the environment from such injuries. Water banks can maintain "envi-
ronmental water accounts" from which water is diverted to environ-
mental purposes. By requiring the maintenance of such water ac-
counts or by imposing a per-gallon tax, the government could generate
sufficient revenues to purchase water to provide for environmental
purposes or, in case of emergency, offset the cost of compensation for
a governmental taking of water rights. Thus, we can avoid instances
like the recent conflict between farmers and the federal government,
143 See Jeffrey J. Clayton, "Here Is a Land Where Life Is Written in Water": Re-writing West-
ern Water Law in the 21st Century, 5 U Denver Water L Rev 525,536 (2002) ("Water rights trans-
fers encompass substantial transaction costs, largely in the legal proceedings, to determine third-
party effects.").
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which had reduced farmers' water supply through application of the
Endangered Species Act.'4
2. A liability rule for third-party damages.
The second rule, a liability rule for third-party damages that re-
sult from transfers, provides protections for water rights, but allows
transfers to proceed that are efficient but might have been otherwise
deterred by negotiation costs and holdout problems under the current
141no injury rule. This rule also provides incentives for transferring par-
ties to take due care as they are likely the parties best able to mitigate
third-party damages.' It encourages them to take care in their trans-
fers to properly quantify the water rights being transferred.
Justice Shenk of the California Supreme Court argued for a simi-
lar approach in his dissent in Herminghaus v Southern California Edi-
son Company:47 if a proposed change in water use will create a net so-
cietal gain, as the reservoir would have, the proper legal remedy is
damages for injured third parties, not injunctions.46 The costs and
benefits should be weighed. The farmers should have received dam-
ages equal to the cost of irrigation facilities that would be needed in
the wake of the change in water flows.149
This proposed regime, as mentioned above, shifts the "transfer
right" entitlement from third parties (from whom transferring parties
could buy the entitlement) to the transferring parties themselves. Un-der this regime, a third party only loses one important right-the right
to bargain for the subjective cost of the injury that results from a
transfer. Under the liability rule, the third party can get no more than
the court's objective value of the injury. The shift in burden of proof,
with the introduction of a liability rule, is not an argument that water
rights should shift from a property rights regime to a liability regime.
Rather, given the interdependency of water rights, this solution merely
tries to balance two competing ends. It weighs the fact that water
rights will be exploited most efficiently when they are protected as
property rights against the fact that increased transfer fights are nec-
144 See Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage District v United States, 59 Fed Cl 246 (2003) (hold-
ing the government liable for a taking for imposing water restrictions to protect salmon).
145 Such a tort action is analogous to a taking with deferred compensation. See Calabresi
and Melamed, 85 Harv L Rev at 1108-09 (cited in note 12).
146 Posner, Economic Analysis of Law § 6.1 at 167 (cited in note 35) (discussing incentives
to take due care).
147 200 Cal 81, 252 P 607 (1926), superseded on other grounds by State v Superior Court of
Riverside County, 78 Cal App 4th 1019,93 Cal Rptr 2d 276 (2000).
148 See Superior Court, 252 P at 627 (Shenk dissenting) (arguing that because the court candetermine money damages that will adequately compensate the plaintiff for the loss sustained by
the change in water use, an injunction should not be granted).
149 See id.
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essary in order to allow water rights to move to their highest-value
uses.
D. Agriculture as a Cultural Resource
A likely outcome of increased transfer rights is the economic dis-
location of agricultural communities losing water rights.", Land will be
fallowed, farmers will seek work elsewhere, and the agricultural com-
munity that exists today will either diminish or disappear. As long as
water transfers are efficient, those who sell their water rights should
be made better off by the transfers.
However, as a general matter, Westerners, even those completely
unrelated to water right transfers, value the agricultural community as
a cultural resource."' The introduction of transfer rights might thus in-
flict third-party costs on those who value agricultural communities as
a cultural resource as agricultural communities start to disappear. In
addition, there seems to be some support for the view that water is a
cultural resource, and when treated like a commodity that can be
bought and sold it loses its cultural value.5 2
However, these losses are unlikely sufficient to warrant a change
in the proposed regime suggested above. First, if we assigned a hard
value to these cultural values and then "taxed" water transfers to force
transferring parties to internalize the costs of the transfer to these cul-
tural resources, the gains are still likely to outweigh the costs. Second,
water transfers will likely increase the value of cities as a cultural re-
source. The loss of cultural resources of agricultural communities and
water as a noncommodity might be offset by the gain to cities.
Finally, agricultural communities could be protected through di-
rect subsidies. The introduction of greater transfer rights need not re-
sult in any change in overall Western distributional goals. The protec-
tion of agricultural communities can still remain a high priority. The
means of the protection, however, must shift from restraints on alien-
ation to some other form of subsidy.'3
150 For a discussion of contingent valuation of cultural resources (for example, the existence
of traditional farming communities), see generally Richard A. Epstein, The Regrettable Necessity
of Contingent Valuation, 27 J Cultural Econ 259 (2003).
151 See, for example, Joseph L. Sax, Understanding Transfers: Community Rights and the
Privatization of Water, 1 W-Nw J Envir Law-Policy-Thought 13,14 (1994).
152 See, for example, Dorothy Green, State's Water Cannot Be Privately Owned, LA Times
B12 (Jan 1,2004):
In California, water is owned by the people. A water right is the right to use the water. It is
not a property right.... I, for one, would not want to live where such an important life ne-
cessity becomes market-driven-to increase corporate profits-and is available only to
those who can afford to pay.
153 See text accompanying note 83.
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CONCLUSION
The current regime of the Colorado River is under pressure to
change. New demands require water right transfers. The current no in-jury rule, however, makes such transfers difficult and costly. The recent
California River Water Delivery Agreement illustrates the importance
of this need for greater transfer rights. The agreement inflicts injury
on farmers of the Imperial Valley. It indicates that as transfers become
a growing necessity, the no injury rule is becoming a weakening
prohibition.
Transfer rights, once introduced, can either be controlled by the
state, as they were in the California Water Delivery System, or held by
vested right holders. While there are important arguments for both the
state and markets, given the strengths of the market mechanisms,
when checked by legal rules to protect third parties, the market
mechanism seems a better choice.
Water markets provide hope for a more optimal use of the scarce
resources of the Colorado River. Through the price mechanism, water
rights will be put to their most efficient uses. Serious third-party ef-
fects can be mitigated through the adoption of a modified no injury
rule, which allows third parties to enjoin transfers where clear injury
will result from the transfer, and a liability rule that provides for dam-
ages if an injury results from the transfer itself. This regime should re-
duce transaction costs and provide for a more efficient and, in the long
run, beneficial use of the scarce water resources of the American
West.
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